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COMMENTS
NEW TRIAL ORDERS: THE EROSION OF
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
SECTION 657
For a number of years California courts have faced perplexing
problems in the formation and review of new trial orders. California
Code of Civil Procedure section 657 requires trial judges to specify
the grounds upon which a new trial is granted.' Trial judges, how-
ever, have all too frequently failed to comply with the requirements
of section 657.2 In a continuing effort to salvage such orders, the
appellate courts have been compelled to infer that the trial judge
intended to base his grant of a new trial upon one of the grounds
contained in the statute.' The California Legislature, attempting
to alleviate the problem of vagueness in new trial orders, amended
section 657 in 1965. 4
1 Before 1919, Code of Civil Procedure section 657 merely listed the grounds for
the granting of a new trial. The trial judge was not required to specify which ground
was used in granting a new trial. A 1919 amendment added a paragraph providing:
"[Wlhen a new trial is granted upon the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence to
sustain the verdict, the order shall so specify; otherwise, on appeal from such order,
it will be presumed that the order was not based upon that ground." Ch. 100 [1919]
Cal. Stats. 43d Sess. 141. An amendment to this paragraph in 1939 provided that the
specification must be made in writing and filed with the clerk within ten days after
granting the motion. Also, the presumption noted above was made conclusive. Ch.
713 [1939] Cal. Stats. 53d Sess. 2234. In 1965 the legislature added several paragraphs
amending the statute to require a specification of reasons for the ground on which
the new trial was based. In the case of insufficiency of the evidence, a conclusive pre-
sumption that the trial was not granted on that ground if no reasons were specified,
was added. Ch. 1749 [1965] Cal. Stats. 66th Sess. In 1967 the statute was further
amended but in respects not relevant to this comment. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 657
(West Supp. 1967).
2 In Mercer v. Perez, 68 A.C. 102, 104, 436 P.2d 315, 318, 65 Cal. Rptr. 315, 318
(1968), the court said, "Throughout the nearly 50 years that the requirement of
specification of grounds has been on the books, however, the trial judges or their
clerks have all too frequently failed to comply with its mandate by means of a simple
recitation of the words of the statute."
3 Even before Mercer v. Perez the California Supreme Court attempted to call
a halt to the appellate courts' practice of inferring grounds from vague new trial
orders. "Section 657 discloses an intent that the required written specification be
made in some unmistakable way ... and this intent will obviously be frustrated if an
order for a new trial is sustained upon the ground of insufficiency of the evidence
where the language of the order is vague or ambiguous. Whenever the order is in
general terms, mentioning no ground, or specifies grounds not including insufficiency
of the evidence, we must assume that it was not based on that ground." Aced v.
Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co., 55 Cal. 2d 573, 578, 360 P.2d 897, 899 (1961). See Mer-
cer v. Perez, 68 A.C. 102, 108, 436 P.2d 315, 318, 65 Cal. Rptr. 315, 319 (1968), quot-
ing the above language with approval.
4 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 657 (West Supp. 1967).
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In 1968 the Supreme Court of California interpreted the
amended statute in Mercer v. Perez.' The court set forth strict re-
quirements for a trial judge to follow in granting a motion for new
trial on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence. Recent court
The verdict may be vacated and any other decision may be modified or
vacated in whole or in part, and a new or further trial granted on all or part
of the issues, on the application of the party aggrieved, for any of the follow-
ing causes, materially affecting the substantial rights of such party:
1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or
any order of the court or abuse of discretion by which either party was pre-
vented from having a fair trial.
2. Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors
have been induced to assent to any general or specific verdict, or to a finding
on any question submitted to them by the court, by a resort to the determina-
tion of chance, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any one of
the jurors.
3. Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against.
4. Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the appli-
cation, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and
produced at the trial.
5. Excessive or inadequate damages.
6. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision,
or the verdict or other decision is against the law.
7. Error in law, occurring at the trial and excepted to by the party
making the application.
When a new trial is granted, on all or part of the issues, the court shall
specify the ground or grounds upon which it is granted and the court's
reason or reasons for granting the new trial upon each ground stated.
A new trial shall not be granted upon the ground of insufficiency of the
evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, nor upon the ground of
excessive or inadequate damages, unless after weighing the evidence the court
is convinced from the entire record, including reasonable inferences there-
from, that the court or jury clearly should have reached a different verdict
or decision.
The order passing upon and determining the motion must be made and
entered as provided in Section 660 and if the motion is granted must state
the ground or grounds relied upon by the court, and may contain the speci-
fication of reasons. If an order granting such motion does not contain such
specification of reasons, the court must, within 10 days after filing such
order, prepare, sign and file such specification of reasons in writing with the
clerk. The court shall not direct the attorney for a party to prepare either or
both said order and said specification of reasons.
On appeal from an order granting a new trial the order shall be affirmed
if it should have been granted upon any ground stated in the motion, whether
or not specified in the order or specification of reasons, except that (a) the
order shall not be affirmed upon the ground of the insufficiency of the evi-
dence to justify the verdict or other decision, or upon the ground of exces-
sive or inadequate damages, unless such ground is stated in the order granting
the motion and (b) on appeal from an order granting a new trial upon the
ground of the insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other
decision, or upon the ground of excessive or inadequate damages, it shall be
conclusively presumed that said order as to such ground was made only for
the reasons specified in said order or said specification of reasons, and such
order shall be reversed as to such ground only if there is no substantial basis
in the record for any of such reasons.
The 1965 amendment, incorporated above, with which Mercer was concerned,
required the specification of grounds and supporting reasons for insufficiency of the
evidence, and the conclusive presumption against such grounds if such specification of
reasons was not set forth. The 1967 amendment addcd the ground of inadequate
damages and reflects the change in several provisions. The cases cited in this comment
are not concerned with the 1967 amendment.
5 68 A.C. 102, 436 P.2d 315, 65 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1968).
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of appeal decisions, however, appear to erode the stringent require-
ments of Mercer. Although section 657, as amended, states a num-
ber of grounds for granting a motion for new trial,6 this comment
will be limited to examining, in light of Mercer and its progeny,
the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict. 7
MERCER V. PEREZ
Mercer v. Perez concerned an automobile accident in which
verdict was rendered for the defendants. Plaintiff's motion for a
new trial was granted on the "ground" of a miscarriage of justice
because the jury should have reached a different verdict. 8 Although
the ground of insufficiency of the evidence was not mentioned, the
intermediate appellate court 9 held that it was inferred, and that the
reasons given in support of the ground were sufficient to be within
the requirements of the statute.10
On appeal to the California Supreme Court, the decision was
6 See note 4 supra.
7 The volume of cases generated by Mercer, which consider the ground of in-
sufficiency of the evidence, warrants a comment limited to this ground. Since Mercer
was decided on January 23, 1968, the following cases have discussed and interpreted
the purposes of the 1965 amendment and the Mercer decision: Matlock v. Farmers
Mercantile Co., 258 A.C.A. 451, 65 Cal. Rptr. 723 (Jan. 1968) ; Kramer v. Boynton,
258 A.C.A. 230, 65 Cal. Rptr. 669 (Jan. 1968) (modified Feb. 1968) ; Kincaid v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 259 A.C.A. 770, 66 Cal. Rptr. 915 (March 1968) ; Tagney v. Hoy,
260 A.C.A. 377, 67 Cal. Rptr. 261 (March 1968) ; Funderburk v. General Telephone
Co., 262 A.C.A. 978, 69 Cal. Rptr. 275 (June 1968); Higson v. Montgomery Ward &
Co., 263 A.C.A. 343, 69 Cal. Rptr. 497 (June 1968); Ridge v. Calabrese Supply Co.,
263 A.C.A. 595, 69 Cal. Rptr. 844 (June 1968); McLaughlin v. San Francisco, 264
A.C.A. 377, 70 Cal. Rptr. 782 (July 1968); Hilts v. County of Solano, 265 A.C.A.
181, 71 Cal. Rptr. 275 (Aug. 1968); and Hoover v. Emerald, 265 A.C.A. 725, 71 Cal.
Rptr. 500 (Sept. 1968).
8 The trial court's order stated that "after analyzing the evidence" the court
was "of the definite opinion" that there had been "a miscarriage of justice" and the
verdict should have been rendered for plaintiffs. Mercer v. Perez, 68 A.C. 102, 108,
436 P.2d 315, 319, 65 Cal. Rptr. 315, 319 (1968). Although this statement by the
trial court does not unambiguously comply with the statutory mandate that "the
court shall specify the 'ground' on which the motion is granted," the supreme court
inferred the order must have been granted on the ground of insufficiency of the
evidence. Id. at 115, 436 P.2d at 320, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
9 Mercer v. Perez, 59 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1967), vacated.
10 The court of appeal based its reasoning on the history of the Code of Civil
Procedure section 657. In 1961 and again in 1963, the legislature proposed amend-
ments to section 657, both of which were pocket vetoed by the governor. These pro-
posed changes would have required the trial court to specify with particularity in
what respect the evidence was insufficient to justify the verdict. One reason the pro-
posed amendments were not passed was -that the governor believed the changes would
place an undue burden on the trial judge. The appellate court in Mercer determined
from the legislative history that the statute as amended in 1965 was a compromise
and required more than specification of grounds, but less than the specification of the
particular respect in which the evidence was not sufficient. The appellate court found
that the language of the trial judge in this case was within the amended statute. Id.
at 393.
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reversed." In interpreting the amended statute, the supreme court
stated that the legislature added the requirement of specification of
the reasons for granting a new trial for two purposes. 2 One was
to encourage the trial judge to deliberate carefully before granting
a new trial, since ill-considered motions for new trial create needless
litigation.'8 The second purpose of the 1965 amendment to section
657 was to make an appeal more meaningful to both counsel and
the appellate courts, by pointing out the area of the deficiency.' 4
Interpreting section 657 in light of its purposes, the court for-
mulated certain requirements for new trial orders. The specification
by the judge must furnish a "concise but clear statement" of the
reasons for the ground for new trial although the content of the
specification may vary with each particular case.1" If the ground is
insufficiency of the evidence, the judge must briefly cite the respects
in which he finds the evidence to be legally inadequate, and he must
also specify the portion of the record which convinces him that a
different verdict or decision should have been reached.'"
Turning to the case at bar, the supreme court found that specu-
lation was required to ascertain the ground upon which the trial
judge based his new trial order, and that this ambiguity was the
very thing the statutory amendment was designed to eliminate.
11 Mercer v. Perez, 68 A.C. 102, 436 P.2d 315, 65 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1968).
12 Id. at 111, 436 P.2d at 320, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
13 Id. at 111, 436 P.2d at 321, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 321. When a new trial should not
have been granted, subsequent needless litigation causes increased attorney's fees,
court costs, and further delays the pursuit of justice. For example, a litigant who has
already waited two years for a trial is further delayed and harassed by a new trial
order; the litigant faces rising attorney fees in addition to the further wait for the
remedy to which he may be entitled. Under the pressure of delay and additional fees
an injured plaintiff with costly medical bills could be forced into accepting a disad-
vantageous settlement rather than waiting for another trial.
14 Id. When counsel and the court of review can easily ascertain the deficiency
of the evidence for which the new trial was granted, much needless searching and
speculation is avoided. It becomes unnecessary for the appellate court to search the
entire record to find grounds to sustain new trial orders, and the particular insuf-
ficiency of the evidence to which opposing counsel may address themselves on retrial
is limited. Section 657 also states that the issues, all or part, may be retried. CAL. CoDE
CrV. PROC. § 657, paras. 1-2 (West Supp. 1967). Specification of the reasons for the
grant of a new trial, therefore, may accelerate subsequent litigation by limiting the
issues on retrial.
15 Id. at 113, 436 P.2d at 322, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 322.
16 Id. at 114, 436 P.2d at 322-23, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 322-23. "[W]e hold that if the
ground relied upon is 'insufficiency of the evidence' the judge must briefly recite the
respects in which he finds the evidence to be legally inadequate; no other construction
is consonant with the conclusive presumption on appeal that the order was made 'only
for the reasons specified.' Phrasing the requirement in terms of the codification of the
trial judge's power in the second paragraph of the amendments . . . such an order
must briefly identify the portion of the record which convinces the judge 'that the
court or jury clearly should have reached a different verdict or decision.'"
17 Id. at 115, 436 P.2d at 319-20, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 319-20.
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Nevertheless, by referring to plaintiff's notice of motion for new
trial, the court reluctantly concluded that the ground of insufficiency
of the evidence was specified.' However, the court found that the
trial judge did not supply reasons either in the order or subsequent
written specification.' 9 Therefore, since section 657 conclusively
presumes that an order for new trial for insufficiency of the evidence
is made only for the reasons specified,2" and since in Mercer the
trial judge failed to specify reasons for the new trial order, the su-
preme court did not consider insufficiency of the evidence as a
ground."'
Mercer laid down needed guidelines by which the trial judge
should test the adequacy of new trial orders. The requirement of
a clear statement of reasons and identification of the portion of
the record from which the insufficiency arises alleviates the old
problem of ambiguity in new trial orders. Subsequent cases, how-
ever, point out difficulties in the practical application of the Mercer
test.
EROSION OF THE MERCER TEST BY THE COURTS OF APPEAL
The first court of appeal case to interpret the amended statute
was Matlock v. Farmers Mercantile Company.22 Matlock arose out
of an automobile accident in which defendant's employee collided
with plaintiff's vehicle. Defendant prevailed, but plaintiff obtained
a new trial on the ground of insufficient evidence to justify the
verdict. The trial court specified its reasons for granting a new
trial as follows: There was no allegation of contributory negligence;
agency and scope of employment were not contested; and, sub-
stantial evidence indicated defendant's employee was negligent, and
as a result of his negligence plaintiff was injured. 23
18 Id.
19 Id. at 114, 436 P.2d at 323, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 323. "[I]f the court's statement
that the jury 'should have rendered a verdict for the plaintiffs' is barely construable as
the ground of its ruling, it is a fortiori inadequate to serve also as the reason for
adopting that ground."
20 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 657, para. 5 (West Supp. 1967).
21 The ground of insufficiency of the evidence (or excessive or inadequate dam-
ages) must be stated in the motion for new trial; the appellate court will not search
the record for these grounds. A court of review, however, may search the record to
find support for the other grounds set out in section 657. CAL. CODE CIV. PRoC. § 657,
para. 4 (West Supp. 1967). In Mercer there were no other grounds upon which fur-
ther inquiry could be based and the new trial order was reversed. Mercer v. Perez,
68 A.C. 102, 117, 436 P.2d 315, 325, 65 Cal. Rptr. 315, 325 (1968).
22 258 A.C.A. 451, 65 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1968).
23 Id. at 453-54, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 725. The exact language of the new trial order
was, "ITihat a new trial be and the same is hereby granted to both plaintiffs as to
both defendants upon the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict.
The reasons for granting the new trial upon the ground hereinbefore stated are as
1968]
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On defendant's appeal from the new trial order, the appellate
court held that the trial judge's reasons encompassed most of the
trial record and that requiring the trial judge to show the portion
of the record upon which he based his opinion would necessitate an
exhausting summary of the entire record.24 The court relied on the
language in Mercer which stated that the specification of reasons
could vary according to the facts of the particular case.25
Shortly after Matlock the court of appeal decided Kincaid v.
Sears, Roebuck & Company,26 an action for malicious prosecution.
Judgment was entered for the plaintiff, and defendant was granted
a new trial. The trial court stated that the evidence failed to show
that the defendant lacked probable cause for arrest.27 Plaintiff con-
tended on appeal that, although the trial court specified insufficiency
of the evidence as the ground for the new trial order, it did not
furnish clear and concise reasons."
The appellate court held that the specification of reasons com-
plied with section 657 as interpreted by Mercer. The new trial order
met the test of a clear and concise statement of reasons, and as a
result stated the insufficiency of the evidence to which counsel and
the reviewing court could confine themselves.29 Kincaid discussed
and impliedly criticized the language in Mercer which required the
trial court to identify the portion of the record which indicated the
evidence was insufficient to justify the verdict." The court also
follows: there being no plea of contributory negligence, and agency and scope of em-
ployment being admitted, the case was submitted to the jury for decision upon the
issues of negligence of the driver, Henry A. Moranda, proximate cause and damages.
There was substantial evidence produced at the trial which disclosed that both plain-
tiffs were injured and both plaintiffs suffered injury as a proximate result of the
automobile accident in which the parties were involved. The evidence further dis-
closes substantial evidence that Henry A. Moranda, agent of Farmers Mercantile Co.,
was negligent in the manner in which he drove the defendant's automobile at the time
and place of the accident involved in this case."
24 Id. at 456, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 726.
25 "No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to the content of such a specifica-
tion, and it will necessarily vary according to the facts and circumstances of each
case." Mercer v. Perez, 68 A.C. 102, 113, 436 P.2d 315, 322, 65 Cal. Rptr. 315, 322
(1968).
26 259 A.C.A. 770, 66 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1968).
27 Id. at 773, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 917. The trial court granted the new trial for in-
sufficiency of the evidence "IFlor the reason that the evidence does not establish by
a preponderance thereof that the defendant did not have probable cause for the arrest
of plaintiff. . . ." Id. (emphasis omitted).
28 Id. at 777, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 919-20.
29 Id. at 777, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 919.
30 Id. at 775, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 918. Analyzing the Mercer requirements, the Kin-
caid court stated, "Our reading of Mercer v. Perez leads us to what we believe is the
more reasonable and practical construction. We conclude that the trial judge is not
necessarily required to cite page and line of the record, or discuss the testimony of
particular witnesses, but instead he need only point out the particular 'deficiency' of
COMMENTS
stated that in cases of misconduct of a jury or of failure to find on
a material issue resulting in a verdict against the law, it is easy to
point to the exact reason for granting a new trial. But, in cases
of insufficiency of the evidence it may not be possible for the trial
judge to substantiate his reasons by isolating the portion of the
record which indicates the insufficient evidence; 3 that is, it is not
practical for the trial judge to point out all the portions of the record
from which he draws his inferences in deciding that the evidence
is insufficient. The Kincaid court stated that in ordinary negligence
actions a brief recital of reasons for insufficiency may be contained
in a statement that the moving party was not negligent, or that the
other party was contributorily negligent. 2 The court reasoned that
the statute itself does not expressly require the trial judge to indicate
the portions of the record upon which the motion for new trial is
based.33 The statute states that the new trial shall be ordered only
if "[A] fter weighing the evidence, the court is convinced from the
entire record, including reasonable inferences therefrom, that the
court or jury clearly should have reached a different verdict or deci-
sion. ' 34 The court therefore concluded that the reasons explaining
the grounds for a new trial need only contain a clear statement
which would allow counsel and reviewing court to know the scope
of the deficiency in the evidence. 5 A rehearing was denied by the
supreme court.
In Funderburk v. General Telephone Company,36 the court of
appeal accepted the reasoning of Kincaid and restated the proposi-
tion that the trial judge, when granting a motion for new trial, need
only furnish a clear and concise statement of reasons and need not
specifically point to a portion of the trial record.37 Funderburk
involved an automobile accident. The jury reached a decision for
the defendant and the trial judge asked the foreman whether or
not the jury had found the defendant negligent. 38 The foreman
answered that the jury did not find the defendant negligent.39 The
trial judge granted a new trial on the ground of insufficiency of the
evidence to justify the verdict, reasoning that defendant driver was
the prevailing party's case which convinces him the judgment should not stand. This
accomplishes the purpose of the statute by enabling a reviewing court to 'determine
if there is a substantial basis for finding such a deficiency.'"
31 Id. at 776, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 919.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 776-77, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 919.
U CA.. CODE CIV. PROC. § 657, para. 3 (West Supp. 1967).
35 259 A.C.A. at 778, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 920.
36 262 A.C.A. 978, 69 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1968).
37 Id. at 982, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 278.
38 Id. at 980, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 276.
89 Id.
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"negligent in the operation of his vehicle."'  The judge made no
mention of contributory negligence, nor did he ask the jury how it
found on that issue. The appellate court stated that new trial orders
would not be reversed simply because the trial judge did not set
forth each step in the reasoning which led to the new trial order."
This rationale assumes that the trial judge knew that contributory
negligence would bar the plaintiff and therefore must have reasoned
against the defendant on that issue.12 Funderburk cited Kincaid for
the rule that specification of reasons in terms of an ultimate fact is
adequate to satisfy the statute. 3
Still another court of appeal case, Ridge v. Calabrese Supply
Company,44 disregarded the Mercer "portion of the record" test.
The court cited both Matlock and Kincaid as authority, and held by
implication that it was not necessary to identify the exact portion of
the record upon which the trial court relied."' Even though the trial
judge did not point to a portion of the trial record, he did furnish
an excellent and detailed specification of reasons for believing that
defendant was negligent in the operation of the mechanism which
caused injury to plaintiff.4" The court of appeal upheld the order
for new trial.
40 Id. at 981, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 277-78.
41 Id. at 986, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 280.
42 Id. at 982, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 277.
43 "[We think that Kincaid stands for a rule that a specification of reasons
couched in terms of ultimate fact is adequate." Id. at 985, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 279. This
reasoning would make a statement such as "defendant was not negligent" sufficient
specification of reasons for the ground of insufficiency of the evidence.
44 263 A.C.A. 595, 69 Cal. Rptr. 844 (1968). This case arose from an accident in
which plaintiff was injured by a concrete mixer operated by defendant's employee.
45 Id. at 603, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 849 (by implication).
46 Id. at 602, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
"1. The Court is of the opinion that the jury did not understand the true im-
port of the statement of counsel for plaintiff, when he, in the course of his argu-
ment to the jury, addressed the Court and said he wished to dismiss the action
against the defendant Everett Wallace, the employee of the defendant Calabrese Sup-
ply Company, a corporation; that this ill chosen strategy of counsel for the plaintiff
left the impression with the jury that the plaintiff was exonerating the said employee
of said defendant corporation of negligence; that the jury concluded that if the
defendant corporation's employee, Everett Wallace, was not negligent, the defendant
corporation could not be held under the rule of respondeat superior, overlooking the
instruction of the Court that if Everett Wallace was negligent his negligence would be
imputed to the defendant Calabrese Supply Co., a corporation, his employer . I." d.
at 601-02 n.3, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 848 n.3.
"2. The Court is of the opinion that since the defendant corporation's employee,
Everett Wallace, was in charge of the dangerous instrumentality and was in control
of the device to raise and lower the chute, it was his duty to take the precaution to
check the arc of the chute to determine whether the maximum height to which the
chute could be elevated would safely clear the wall upon which the plaintiff was
working at the time the cement mixer was put into operation; that this was a duty
that should not have been delegated to anyone else unauthorized or-unfamiliar with
the actual operation of the particular concrete mixer being used, even though Wallace
[Vol. 9
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In Hilts v. County of Solano47 the trend of the courts of appeal
toward upholding new trial orders with a brief specification of rea-
sons was broken.48 In Hilts the plaintiff was granted a new trial and
one of the defendants appealed. The trial judge's order for new trial
stated that the evidence indicated the defendant was negligent and
the decedent was not negligent. 9 The appellate court held that,
even if the trial judge's order could be construed as based on the
ground of insufficiency of the evidence, the order failed since it did
may have been assisted in the pouring of the cement by the employer of the plain-
tiff, Dusharme, and by another employee of the latter, Clifton Leon Jackson; . . ." Id.
at 601-02, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 848-49.
"3. It is the opinion of the Court that the jury was misled by the questions pro-
pounded in the Special Findings, prepared by counsel for the Intervenor, State Com-
pensation Insurance Fund, and submitted with the consent and approval of counsel
for all of the parties; that the questions propounded and the answers made by the
jury were: 'Was the plaintiff's employer, Wendell P. Dusharme, or the plaintiff's co-
employer, Clifton Leon Jackson, negligent? Yes.' 'Was said negligence of either Wen-
dell P. Dusharme or Clifton Leon Jackson a proximate cause of plaintiff's injury?
Yes.'; and that by these Special Findings the jury was misled into believing that the
only remaining culpable persons were the plaintiff's employer, Dusharme, and the
plaintiff's fellow employee, Jackson, especially after the dismissal of the action against
the defendant corporation's employee, Everett Wallace, by the counsel for the plain-
tiff during his argument to the jury." Id. at 601-02 n.3, 69 Cal. Rptr. 848 n.3.
47 265 A.C.A. 181, 71 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1968). This case arose out of an automo-
bile accident. Plaintiffs sued the driver of the other automobile and also the county
which designed the intersection.
48 It is possible that the trend of the courts of appeal towards leniency in the
review of new trial orders was broken just prior to Hilts. See McLaughlin v. San
Francisco, 264 A.C.A. 377, 70 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1968). In McLaughlin the negligence of
the defendant was stipulated and the case went to trial solely on the issue of damages.
Defendant's motion for new trial was granted on the ground of insufficiency of the
evidence to justify the verdict and, "[Biased on failure to prove reasonable total dam-
ages both general and special. . . ." The appellate court on review held that the
ground, insufficiency of the evidence, was clearly stated but that the trial court failed
to specify its reasons for that ground; damages were the only issues of the case and
the purported reason was that the evidence on those issues was insufficient. The
"reasons" merely restated the ground itself, so the order could not be sustained on
the ground of insufficiency. The appellate court also mentioned that speculation was
needed to decide which part of the special or general damages was unreasonable
speculation which was to be eliminated by compliance with the amendment to sec-
tion 657.
The reviewing court did not specifically mention the fact that section 657 re-
quires a conclusive presumption that both insufficiency of the evidence and excessive
damages are not the ground for a new trial order if they are not supported by reasons
specified by the trial judge. This provision, however, could have influenced the appel-
late court's decision, and indicates that the McLaughlin holding might truly be unique
to its particular fact situation.
The holding in Hilts, however, leaves no doubt as to its definite departure from
the trend of leniency which began with Matlock. In Hilts the new trial order was
grounded on insufficiency of the evidence and the reasons were that defendant was
negligent and the plaintiff was not. The new trial order in Hilts cannot be distinguished
from the trial judges' specification of reasons in Matlock and Funderburk. The appel-
late court in Hilts, however, chose not to follow the previous courts of appeal cases
and found the trial court's specification of reasons inadequate in light of Mercer and
section 657.
49 265 A.C.A. 181, 194, 71 Cal. Rptr. 275, 287 (1968).
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not show the respects in which the evidence was legally inadequate.0
Thus the order for new trial was reversed.51
Soon after Hilts, the court of appeal decided Hoover v. Em-
erald.52 In this case plaintiff received judgment, and defendant's
motion for new trial was granted on the ground of insufficiency of
the evidence. The trial court, reminded by defendant's counsel that
a reason was needed to support the ground, stated that there was
"[N]ot sufficient evidence that defendant was negligent."53 On ap-
peal the court held that the ground and reasons were effectively
stated in one sentence.54 Although the trial judge made no reference
as to how he reached his decision or which portion of the record
supported his conclusion, the appellate court sustained the new trial
order.
ANALYSIS
The large volume of cases generated by Mercer55 indicates that
the amendments to section 657 have left the vagueness problem in
new trial orders largely unresolved. In Mercer the supreme court
attempted to alleviate the historical problems of ambiguity in new
trial orders by a strict interpretation of the statute. Within the same
month Matlock held that one of the Mercer requirements, the
50 Id. at 194-95, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 287.
51 It is interesting to note that Justice Molinari was the appellate court judge who
decided Hilts. Justice Molinari appeared for the Judicial Council and Legislative Com-
mittee in favor of the 1965 amendment to section 657. In an address before the Cali-
fornia Trial Lawyers Association on September 19, 1965, the Justice stated the purposes
and requirements of section 657 as amended:
Prior to the recent amendment to section 657, the trial court in making
its order granting a new trial was not required to specify the ground upon
which it was granting the motion, except where it was granted upon the
ground of the insufficiency of the evidence, and even as to this ground, there
was no requirement for a statement of the reasons upon which the motion
was granted.
The significant change brought about by the amendment to section 657 is
that when a new trial is granted the court is now required to specify the
reason or reasons for granting the new trial upon each ground stated. Ac-
cordingly, the party against whom the motion is granted will now be advised
of the rationale forming the basis of the order. In the event of an appeal, this
rationale will be focused upon determining whether the trial court did in
fact abuse its discretion. In other words, the scope of appellate review will
be focused upon whether the reasons given by the trial court in support of
the grounds stated for the granting of a new trial are in conformity with
fixed legal principles and the spirit of the law which demands substantial jus-
tice. It thus appears to be the legislative intent that in the review of the
propriety of orders granting a new trial the scope of review is no longer to
be confined to judicial action but is to include the judicial reasoning for
such action.
52 265 A.C.A. 725, 71 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1968). This case arose out of an automobile
accident.
53 Id. at 726, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
54 Id. at 728, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
55 See note 7 supra.
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identification of the portion of the record upon which the trial court
based its decision, was not necessary under the circumstances of
Matlock. Shortly after Matlock, Kincaid also reasoned that identify-
ing the portion of the record was not necessary and added that the
trial court's reasons would be adequate if the court merely stated
that the losing party was not negligent.
It is clear that vague new trial orders, which force an appellate
court to search the entire record, violate the spirit of section 657
and should be avoided. However, if the insufficiency of the evidence
is not in the record or permeates the entire record, it would be either
impossible or impractical to require a trial judge to point out a
specific portion of the record.
The trial judge should be responsible for explaining new trial
orders with sufficient specificity that both counsel and the reviewing
court are made aware of the precise deficiency in the evidence. The
problem is to develop a workable standard which satisfies the goals
of Mercer and resolves the practical difficulties voiced by the courts
of appeal.
Theoretically, the test articulated by Mercer is an excellent
standard to guide the review of the adequacy of the trial court's
specification of grounds and reasons for a new trial. The Mercer
test would preclude the speculation and search of the record which
the amended statute attempts to eliminate5 6
Subsequent courts of appeal decisions such as Matlock and
Kincaid held that the "portion of the record" test could not be ap-
plied to their circumstances. Kincaid's reasoning points out a
practical limitation of the Mercer test: A trial judge's reasons for
the ground of insufficiency of the evidence often cannot be found
in any one portion of the record, but must come from inferences
drawn from the entire record.57
Although Mercer's "portion of the record" test is subject to
justifiable criticism, Kincaid and its followers have undermined not
only the "portion of the record" test but also the "concise but clear
statement of the reasons" test. For example, according to Matlock,
Kincaid, Funderburk and Hoover, the trial court may simply state
that one party is "negligent" and the other party is "not negligent."
56 The Mercer test requires both identification of the portion of the record
which convinced the trial court that the evidence was insufficient and a clear and
concise statement of the reasons for the ground of insufficiency. Should an appeal be
taken from the new trial order, counsel and the reviewing court would know the exact
points of insufficiency to which they must address themselves.
57 Kincaid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 259 A.C.A. 770, 776, 66 Cal. Rptr. 915, 919
(1968).
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This type of specification, if it is specification, does not inform
counsel or the appellate court whether or not there are well-grounded
reasons for the new trial order. For example, if the cause of action
involves the issue of negligence, and the trial judge specifies that in
his belief that issue should have been decided contrary to the jury
verdict, he is in fact only saying that the evidence is insufficient to
justify the verdict. This is not actually a reason supporting the
ground but just another way of stating the ground. This type of
specification is redundancy, not explanation, and fails to meet the
purposes of the amended statute. 8
SUGGESTED SOLUTION
Whenever possible the trial judge should point out the portion
of the record which convinces him that a new trial should be granted
for insufficiency of the evidence. In some cases, however, this is
not possible. The trial judge may not be able to pinpoint all the
evidence in the record from which he draws his inferences. For in-
stance, a new trial may be granted largely because of the demeanor
of the witness; 59 the judge may simply not believe one or more of
the material witnesses who testified for the prevailing party. It is
within the court's discretion to disbelieve testimonial evidence and
grant a motion for new trial on the ground of insufficiency of the
evidence.6" However, demeanor often cannot be found in the written
record, and it would, in some cases, therefore, be impossible for the
trial judge to point to the portion of the record that supports his
disbelief.
A satisfactory test for specifying the ground of insufficiency
of the evidence lies somewhere between Mercer and Kincaid. The
trial judge should be required to specify the respects in which the
evidence was insufficient or to state with particularity why it was
not substantial. The reasons must be more than mere ultimate facts
as advocated by Funderburk.6' The reasons must contain the per-
tinent evidentiary facts of the case which lead the trial judge to
believe a new trial is warranted.62 If the defendant is "not negli-
58 See note 51 supra.
59 CAL. EviD. CODE § 780 (West 1966). The witness' "demeanor while testify-
ing" and "the manner in which he testifies" may lead the court to doubt the accuracy
of his statement and influence it to disregard his positive testimony concerning a par-
ticular fact. Davis v. Judson, 159 Cal. 121, 128, 113 P. 147, 150 (1910).
60 Mercer v. Perez, 68 A.C. 102, 107, 436 P.2d 315, 320, 65 Cal. Rptr. 315, 320
(1968).
61 See note 43 supra, for an example of "ultimate fact." Note that Funderburk
cited Kincaid for holding that specification of reason in terms of an ultimate fact is
adequate to satisfy the requirements of section 657.
62 The trial judge in Ridge enunciated his reasons by the use of "evidentiary
facts." See note 46 supra.
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gent," the court should show the particulars in which the evidence is
inadequate. If the judge believes, for example, that the defendant
was operating his vehicle in a reasonable manner and could not
have avoided the impending collision, the judge should specify the
evidentiary facts which cause him to believe that defendant was
operating his vehicle in a reasonable manner. 63 Such specification
of reasons would indicate why the trial judge held the verdict to be
erroneous. A trial judge could give a short and concise statement,
and still include the specific evidentiary weaknesses in the prevailing
party's case.
The above suggested compromise would not unduly burden the
trial judge. 4 A concise but meaningful specification of reasons for
supporting the ground of insufficiency of the evidence would not
overtax the trial judiciary and would lift the fog of ambiguity in
which both appealing counsel and reviewing court have groped.
Richard C. Gardner
63 Even demeanor which often cannot be found in the "cold record" could be
explained by the trial judge.
64 Section 657 requires that the judge prepare the reasons himself and, if the
reasons are not included in the order, submit them within ten days from the granting
of a new trial. Kincaid voiced the fear that pointing to a portion of the record would
overburden the trial judge.
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